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This paper compares recovery in the wake of three recent earthquakes: the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in March 2011; the Van earthquake in Turkey in October 2011; and the Maule 
earthquake in Chile in February 2010. The authors visited all three locations approximately 
12–18 months after the incidents and interviewed earthquake specialists, disaster managers, 
urban planners, and local authorities. A key challenge to post-disaster recovery planning is bal-
ancing speed and deliberation. While affected communities must rebuild as quickly as possible, 
they must also seek to maximise the opportunities for improvement that disasters provide. The 
three case studies bring this dilemma into stark relief, as recovery was respectively slow, fast, and 
just right in the aftermath of the events: the Government of Japan adopted a deliberate approach 
to recovery and reconstruction; speed was of the essence in Turkey; and an effective balance between 
speed and deliberation was achieved in Chile.
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Introduction
Alexander (2013) suggests that post-disaster planning has three main aims: (i) the 
timely restoration of normal activities and living conditions: (ii) the protection of the 
community against the future impact of hazards; and (iii) the formulation and achieve-
ment of common objectives among the parties involved. Following disasters, govern-
ments often clamour to reduce risk quickly, to rebuild communities, and to reinstate 
permanence (Comfort, 2005). This urgent pressure to address complex, difficult deci-
sions can lead to reactive policies that may increase the long-term vulnerability of 
affected populations (Ingram et al., 2006). Olshansky (2006) underlines the impor-
tance of planning and the need to balance speed and deliberation in post-disaster 
recovery, which inevitably witnesses tension between the two. Speed is crucial to 
keep businesses functioning, to rebuild infrastructure, and to supply temporary and 
permanent housing for survivors, but there is also a ‘window of opportunity’ in which 
to introduce change.
 Ingram et al. (2006) found that, after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 
2004, a hastily designed coastal buffer zone policy in Sri Lanka resulted in the massive 
relocation of the affected population and in economic, environmental, and social prob-
lems that threaten the well-being of these coastal communities. Lloyd-Jones (2007) 
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made an analogous point while commenting on post-tsunami recovery in the state 
of Tamil Nadu in south India. Families that traditionally depended on fishing were 
opposed to relocation to new villages some distance from the coast. In addition, some 
of the newly reconstructed houses remained unoccupied because they failed to meet 
basic needs and to accommodate cultural practices, or because they were in the wrong 
place. Similar issues manifested themselves in Thailand (Brown, Platt, and Bevington, 
2010): people in the village of Ban Nam Khem whose livelihood depended on fishing 
had been moved inland to unpopular government and non-governmental organisa-
tion (NGO)-sponsored housing developments. Some families were, however, return-
ing to the old centre and rebuilding. The urge to resettle people away from the coast 
has created tensions between immediate concern of another tsunami, a relatively rare 
phenomenon in the Indian Ocean, and long-term well-being, threatening coastal 
livelihoods and exposing people to other more frequent hazards, such as flooding.
Methodology
The approach adopted in the three case studies reported here—the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in March 2011, the Van earthquake in eastern Turkey in October 2011, 
and the Maule earthquake in Chile in February 2010—is principally ethnographic.1 
The studies were part of a larger project investigating recovery after major earthquake-
related disasters in 10 countries (Chile, China, Iran, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Thailand, Turkey, and the United States), the objective of which was to identify com-
monalities and to define the critical factors in improving resilience and recovery. 
The key to this has been to try to distinguish between what is specific to each event 
or country and general lessons that can be applied in other places. The affected areas 
were visited, typically 12–18 months after the incident, and the main actors were 
interviewed, including: politicians and local governors; architects, engineers, plan-
ners, and scientists; personnel in local government offices, central government min-
istries, special disaster authorities, and civil defence and emergency response entities; 
business people; members of chambers of commerce, voluntary organisations, and 
local NGOs; and community leaders and residents. It is important to note that inter-
views elicit both facts and subjective opinion and that these individual accounts, like 
all interpretations of reality, may be partial and biased. This issue was addressed by 
careful choice of informant, by interviewing at least 30 people in each place, by asking 
probing questions, and by verification through observation, crosschecking between 
informants, and conducting a comprehensive review of published sources. 
Building back better
Disasters leave huge scars on people’s lives, the economy, and infrastructure. Yet, 
despite the damage, there are opportunities to do some good—to ‘build back better’ 
(Gunewadena and Schuller, 2008). Reconstruction after an earthquake is a complex 
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process entailing economic, political, and social issues as well as geotechnical con-
siderations. However, it is also an opportunity to change how things are done. All 
thriving cities constantly face decisions about change, but what characterises post-
disaster planning is the urgency and the seriousness of the situation (Olshansky and 
Johnson, 2010). 
 Post-disaster recovery typically follows an S-shaped curve (see Figure 1) (Lallemant, 
2013). The size of the population of an area may decrease gradually and then either 
recover or not, depending on the relative attractiveness of the place (Me-Bara and 
Valdez, 2004). Disasters can be observed in the archaeological record and recovery 
may take decades. Kates and Pijawka (1977) presented estimates of the time required 
for full population recovery after a disaster hit an urban area in ancient times (see 
Table 1). They provided estimates of the original (pre-event) population of each 
location and the percentage of the population that was lost in the incident (through 
Figure 1. Idealised recovery curve
Source: Lallemant (2013, p. 1).
Table 1. Historic earthquakes and recovery time 
Year Location of earthquake Population Fatalities (%) Recovery time (years)
1746 Lima, Peru 37,000 20 40
1755 Lisbon, Portugal 213,000 5 6
1773 Guatemala City, Guatemala 34,000 33 50
1775 Kashan, Iran 40,000 75 85
1822 Aleppo, Syria 150,000 67 56
Source: Kates and Pijawka (1977).
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death and outward migration). Recovery time is defined as the time it took for the 
population to reach the pre-event size. The recovery times for these historic events 
correlate closely with the proportion of fatalities. Nowadays, given infinitely better 
communication and transportation, the time taken for the population to recover to 
the pre-event number is shorter in most cases; an oft-quoted figure is 20 years. 
 Population size, though, does not tell the whole story. The population of Bam, 
Iran, at the time of the earthquake on 26 December 2003 was approximately 80,000. 
When we visited the city in January 2014, it was roughly 120,000, but most of the 
houses were unfinished and the rusting steel frames of the new houses were stark 
reminders of continuing recovery.
 Opportunities exist in the aftermath of earthquakes to enhance hazard mitigation. 
Public awareness of the risk is high, and the issue is accorded high priority on political 
agendas (Scholl, 1986). However, experience shows that current hazard response and 
mitigation practices often sustain communities as they are, and merely perpetuate 
the disaster damage cycle rather than address the root causes of the problems (Graham, 
1999). There is a natural tendency among survivors to want to restore their lives 
and communities to normal as quickly as possible (Scholl, 1986), putting pressure on 
the authorities and inhibiting mitigation strategies and long-term planning. Nevertheless, 
most communities do become safer and less vulnerable to earthquakes as a result of 
post-disaster reconstruction (Haas et al., 1977; Rubin et al., 1985).
The ‘window of opportunity’
If official agencies do not act quickly, many victims will begin to rebuild where 
and how they choose. Although speed is necessary, it is also vital to take the time 
to plan post-disaster reconstruction. Planning can create opportunities to improve 
land use and infrastructure, enhance safety, promote good design, involve citizens in 
decision-making, and find cost-effective solutions. But if it takes too long, it will be 
ineffective. Alexander (2013) cautions that reconstruction that occurs very rapidly 
should be treated with suspicion, for it implies that there has been a failure to consult 
adequately with interested parties. Time is not limitless. The worst cases, he suggests, 
are either those in which planners ride roughshod over local interests or those in which 
a conflict of interest leads to stalemate.
 Reactive policies are understandable in the context of the urgent policy needs in 
post-disaster situations (Ingram, 2006). Relief has to be rapid and short-term recov-
ery efforts must aim to minimise the time needed to rehouse people safely and to 
re-establish livelihoods. During this ‘transitional’ phase it is critical that communities 
are informed about longer-term plans in order to reduce anxiety and frustration. 
Long-term recovery policies require comprehensive, site-based assessments of risk 
and vulnerability and effective consultation with stakeholders. Long-term multi-sector 
strategic planning can facilitate the sustainable management of resources, supply 
livelihood support, strengthen infrastructure, improve urban planning and design, 
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extend insurance, and enhance disaster preparedness at the national, regional, and 
community level.
 Comerio (2013) uses two key factors, government involvement and community 
participation, to classify housing recovery in various counties that have experienced 
recent disasters (see Figure 2). While the placement of each country is based on the 
author’s judgement, the goal is to represent the variety of approaches employed. For 
example, she suggests that Chile and New Zealand combined top-down and bottom-
up approaches, providing government leadership and funding while ensuring commu-
nity empowerment in decision-making. In contrast, China and Italy assumed strong 
government leadership roles in supplying replacement housing but did not engage 
local communities in most aspects of decision-making. By comparison, Comerio (2013) 
suggests that Haiti’s weak government and high levels of poverty limited recovery 
following the earthquake of 2010.
 We visited seven of the nine countries (highlighted by rectangles around the name) 
depicted in Figure 2, as well as various others, and interviewed people involved in 
Figure 2. A comparison of recovery approaches 
Source: Comerio (2013).
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planning recovery. Comerio’s assessment of the strength of the government’s role 
was found to be broadly correct. Her idea has been extended here in a bid to graph 
the window of opportunity in these nine countries and the others visited and studied 
by the authors.
 The ‘window of opportunity’ for accomplishing post-disaster improvements is 
narrow, in many cases lasting for just 18–36 months after an event. Although there 
is little research on this topic, Comerio (1998) suggests that basic functions should 
be restored within two years to ensure successful recovery. This window of oppor-
tunity varies from one country to another, not so much because it is an inherent 
quality of disaster recovery, but rather because it is a product of the political climate 
in a particular country. Having to deal with an emergency moves issues higher up 
the policy agenda of a government (Kingdom, 1995). In time, other pressing problems 
divert attention. 
 Turkey and Japan represent extremes in this regard. In Turkey, following the Van 
earthquake in October 2011, the window of opportunity was extremely limited in 
duration and extent. Post-disaster planning by the Disaster and Emergency Manage-
ment Presidency (AFAD) and the various government ministries adhered to strict 
protocols with well-defined criteria and there were a small number of decision-
makers and little stakeholder or community involvement. The window of opportunity 
to do things better may have been open for six months at most. 
 In Japan, following the Tōhoku earthquake in March 2011, there was, by contrast, 
a massive concerted effort by many sections of society to come to terms with the 
issues and to devise safer solutions. Despite the efforts of the national government to 
speed up the process by providing resources and imposing deadlines, the effect was 
to delay reconstruction. The window of opportunity is still, to an extent, open five 
years after the event. 
 In Chile, meanwhile, following the Maule earthquake in February 2010, the window 
of opportunity was open for about 18–24 months, during which architects seconded 
from the University of Bío Bío by the regional government worked on masterplans 
for the disaster-affected coastal communities and planners from the Ministry of 
Transport in Santiago devised a new masterplan for Concepción, the capital of the 
Bío Bío Region (Platt, 2012). Subsequently, the planners who had been seconded to 
special teams went back to their old jobs and the government’s priorities shifted 
with the change of government from Sebastián Piñera’s centre-right Alliance for Chile 
to former President Michelle Bachelet’s centre-left New Majority party in December 
2013 (Meyer, 2014). 
 Figure 3 shows the results of an attempt to estimate this window of opportunity 
for 12 countries (in terms of recovery and the number of months after the event). 
The estimates are based on fieldwork interviews in 10 of the 12 countries and an 
intense search of published sources. None of the papers and reports specify this time 
period, but, in most cases, inferences can be drawn from how long policy commit-
tees consulted and when final plans were published. 
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Case studies
Japan
The Great East Japan Earthquake, a magnitude 9.0 (Mw) earthquake off the coast 
of Tōhoku in the northeast of the country on 11 March 2011, is the most expensive 
natural disaster recorded in the world to date. The unprecedented tsunami toppled 
sea defences, inundating more than 500 square kilometres of land along this shore-
line. It claimed the lives of some 18,500 people, and destroyed or damaged some 400,000 
and 773,000 dwellings, respectively, as well as severely damaging critical infrastructure 
and buildings. The impact was different on the coastal plain where there was little resist-
ance to the wave and consequently large horizontal inundation and insignificant ver-
tical inundation. In contrast, the Rias coast suffered a high vertical run-up owing to 
the amplifying effect of topography, but limited horizontal inundation (see Figure 4). 
Figure 3. The window of opportunity 
Sources: various reports and papers were used to estimate these times, but the following represent 
the main sources: Chile: Platt (2012); Sandoval and Gonzalez (2015); China: Huang, Zhou, and Wei 
(2014); Haiti: Fan (2013); India: Thiruppugazh (2001); Iran: Omidvar, Zafari, and Derakhshan (2010); Italy: 
OECD (2013); Japan: Matanle (2011); New Zealand: Toomey (2015); Pakistan: Kirk (2008); Thailand: 
Srivichai, Supharatid, and Imamura (2007); Turkey: Turan (2012); United States: Wu and Lindell (2004). 
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Figure 4. Coastline, inundation, and the Tōhoku tsunami of 2011 
Source: authors.
 Two years after the event, when we visited the area and most of the affected towns 
and settlements, recovery was still in its initial stages. The debris had been cleared, 
reconstruction work had started on one-third of destroyed embankments, and the 
Government of Japan was dealing with a difficult temporary housing situation. The 
construction of new permanent housing had taken longer than originally planned, 
but had allowed for longer a consultation process (Pomonis et al., 2013). 
 Lessons were learnt after the Great Hanshin or Kobe earthquake on 17 January 1995 
(Edgington, 2010). The temporary housing viewed by the authors was of high qual-
ity. The containers were 25–30 square metres and had two rooms plus a kitchenette 
and a bathroom. Some families had added porches and had planted flowers and painted 
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murals. The first temporary housing units were available within eight weeks of the 
disaster. Within eight months, 75 per cent of the approximately 450,000 people who 
had sought refuge in evacuation centres had been able to move to alternative accom-
modation (Kawawaki et al., 2013). The principal issue is how long people will have to 
remain in temporary shelter. Some 330,000 people were still in temporary accommo-
dation and 500 remained in evacuation centres 12 months after the earthquake (BBC 
News Asia, 2012). 
 We interviewed people who were living in Kasai Temporary Housing in the city 
of Ishinomaki in Miyagi Prefecture. The air-conditioned containers measuring 30 
square metres were of high quality, with two rooms, a kitchenette and a tiny bath-
room, but they are cramped and people have to live in them four or more years. 
 An important issue is the extent and the complexity of land use changes. After 
the 1933 Sanriku earthquake and tsunami, safe resettlement areas were designated in 
the government’s post-tsunami recovery planning. Resettlement on higher ground 
reduced damage and casualties in 2011 and demonstrates the importance of land use 
mitigation for tsunami-related disaster reduction (Imamura, 2014). Research also 
suggests that, between 1948 and 2010, many people, for convenience or reason of 
ownership, returned to the original tsunami-prone sites along the Sanriku coast or 
began living in vulnerable lowlands, a move that contributed greatly to the losses (see 
Figure 5) (Murao and Isoyama, 2012).
 Japan has a centralised political structure in which the national government main-
tains close oversight over local government. Following the promulgation of the Omnibus 
Figure 5. Residential returns to tsunami-prone sites in Hongo, Touni Village, Iwate 
Prefecture, 1948–2010 
Source: Ono (2014).
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Decentralization Law in 2000, however, participation by residents in planning pro-
cesses was encouraged and local governments began to devise various mechanisms 
for participation (Ohsugi, 2010). Nevertheless, one of the most distinctive features 
of planning in Japan has been the virtual absence of civil society in the formation of 
city planning policy and practice (Sorensen, 2004).
 The central government tried to speed up the process after the disaster of 2011 by 
providing guidelines, finance, human resources, and know-how, but leaving it to 
the municipal authorities to prepare detailed plans. Its top priorities are economic 
revival and safety. The economy is fairly strong in the Sendai plain, but the Rias coast 
was suffering economic and demographic shrinkage before the earthquake. The safety 
imperative has had huge implications for urban planning. No housing will be per-
mitted in the hazard zone and buildings can be no more than five storeys with a shop 
or parking space on the ground floor. The two main protection strategies are relocat-
ing homes to safe places and providing multiple layers of protection. In the Sendai 
plain, where there are no natural hills, the government is building barriers and con-
centrating housing on raised platforms (see Figure 6). People who cannot afford to 
construct their own homes will be moved to higher density apartment blocks. This 
is contentious as many families want to move far inland away from the hazard zone. 
Figure 6. The Iwanuma masterplan: six small settlements concentrated in a new urban 
centre raised behind three embankments
Source: authors’ photograph of a public notice board, Iwanuma City, Miyagi Prefecture, 1 June 2013.
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 Figure 6 shows a typical plan for the Sendai plain. There are three embankments: 
the coastal embankment and the two raised roads. All of the small settlements in the 
hazard zone will be concentrated in a new urban centre and new evacuation routes 
are being created. Along the Rias coast, residential areas in the hazard zone have been 
rezoned as non-residential and homes are being moved to higher ground. Designating 
new areas for housing, building embankments, and terracing slopes all takes time.
 The International Recovery Platform pointed out that the problems of recovery 
are compounded by the shrinkage confronting most rural towns in Japan, where age-
ing and economic and population decline pose special planning challenges (Kawawaki 
et al., 2013). The central government hoped that changes to land use (redefining hous-
ing areas in hazard zones as non-residential), improving transportation links, and 
promoting urban centre regeneration projects would have a positive impact on the 
prospects of these places, as well as making them more resilient to future disasters. 
Measures that would strengthen existing local businesses and city-centre shops, attract 
new industry, and encourage young people to move to the city might have been 
considered, but the lack of jobs has meant that many young people have left the 
area in search of work and better prospects. Up until mid-2014, though, the focus was 
on relocating housing to higher ground and on constructing safety measures such as 
high levees and evacuation towers, rather than on strengthening the local economy 
and addressing economic and demographic decline. 
 There is a question about how much room for adaptation there is locally in the 
application of the central government’s template for recovery. Japan is a compliant 
society and there may be more flexibility than local officials or residents realise. 
There seems, however, to have been no cost–benefit analysis of the huge investment. 
One of the biggest areas of controversy is the building of 400 kilometres of concrete 
seawall of up to nine metres high at a cost of nearly USD 8 billion, or USD 2,000 per 
metre (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 2015). 
 By law, the authorities are obliged to solicit local public opinion; from the earliest 
stages, residents’ views were sought during public meetings, surveys, and workshops, 
but this takes time and causes delay. Members of the younger generation, in their 
forties, are opposed to large embankments and tall seawalls, but they are not the 
decision-makers. Community groups and municipal authorities are dominated by 
elderly men who tend to be conservative and safety conscious.
 The response of the majority along the Rias coast was that the government had 
already decided so they cannot do anything. Some even admire the massive infra-
structure. Unfortunately, people continue to leave and the community may fragment 
because of the delay. Partly because of citizen opposition, the reconstruction of sea 
embankments, which suffered extensive damage, has been delayed considerably. Local 
governments in devastated areas cannot decide on the details of restoration plans, 
as discussions continue on whether or not to prohibit people from returning to coastal 
areas. At the time of the authors’ fieldtrip, 26 months after the tsunami, reconstruc-
tion work had started on only 31 per cent of the destroyed embankments (Daily 
Yomiuri Editorials, 2013). 
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 In Ishinomaki, a large port city east of Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture, there were 
plans to revitalise the city centre. The local community was involved in community 
workshops a year after the disaster, during which there were open discussions about 
the future of the place. The point of concern that caused the most delay was the plan 
for a river protection wall. Historically, the centre was located near the river because 
of the transportation of rice, and many residents object to building a high wall. The 
debate centres on balancing protection and historic value. The government had pro-
posed a 4.5 metre high levee and the citizen’s committee of stakeholders was deliber-
ating how to make the area attractive for visitors when the fieldtrip took place. There 
are plans for a riverfront development to attract visitors, including a fish market with 
a food court and a memorial to those who lost their lives. 
 At Shibitachi on the Rias coast a banner stretched across the village indicating 
the height of the proposed embankments. The base will cover much of the flat area of 
this small fishing village. There are 270 households of elderly ‘recreational’ fishermen 
and their homes will be relocated to higher ground. At Oya East, a beach commu-
nity near Kesennuma, the community group organised by Miura Tomayukin sug-
gested that the proposed nine metre high embankment be moved back. Initially the 
city was unhappy with the idea but changed its mind after receiving a petition. The 
proposed municipal plan is now for a lower embankment farther back, but this needs 
the cooperation of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, the National Forestry 
Department, the Prefecture’s Civil Engineering Department, Japan Railways, and 
the National Highways Agency2. The overlapping responsibility of five different agen-
cies makes decision making difficult and causes delay.
 In Kesennuma City, Akihiko Sugawara, owner of the Sugawara Sake Brewery, 
Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce, and a member of the Strategy Com-
mittee of Municipal Government, said that a citizens’ committee opposes the planned 
five metre embankment as it will change the character of the picturesque seaside town. 
Most residents were evacuated safely, but they are used to living by the sea with all 
its attendant dangers. Committee members are concerned that a delay in reconstruc-
tion will stall economic recovery. The majority of residents are against the proposed 
seawall and hence the deadline was pushed back six months to October 2013. Even 
Japan’s First Lady, Akie Abe, said in an interview with Mainichi Shimbun Weekly 
News (2014) that she had been to Kamaishi recently and that she opposed the mas-
sive seawall construction project. More recently, in an article in The Japan Times 
(Daimon, 2016), she stated that ‘it’s misleading to call the construction “restoration 
work”. Local governments are not rebuilding walls that were destroyed by the quake 
and tsunami . . . they are replacing 5-meter seawalls with barriers that, in some cases, 
are twice as high as their predecessors’.
 Local government has considerable problems with consultation, which is time-
consuming. It is not easy to convince communities to relocate yet people want to be 
safe. The fundamental problem is that the authorities do not really know the likely 
size of the population in each place needing reconstruction. Local governments want 
to consolidate communities to make it more efficient and economical to deliver 
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services, since many of these places were in decline before the tsunami. If the municipal 
authorities have to provide facilities and services for each community, no matter how 
small, the cost will be enormous.3
 Overall, recovery in Japan has been slowed by deliberation and the safety impera-
tive of building back better. But the picture is complex. Seawalls and relocation are 
appropriate in some places, such as in Iwanuma and Natori, Sendai, and plans here 
have proceeded relatively quickly. In other places, such as in villages and towns along 
the Rias coast from Ishinomaki to Kamaishi, expensive seawalls will destroy beaches 
and harbours and people are resistant to being relocated inland or herded into larger 
centres. This deliberation has undoubtedly slowed things down, but the outcomes may 
be better and more acceptable in the long run.
Turkey
The magnitude 7.2 (Mw) Van earthquake (USGS, 2011) occurred at 13:41 local time 
on 23 October 2011 and was felt throughout eastern Turkey and adjacent countries. 
The epicentre was 16 kilometres north-northeast of Van near the town of Erciş 
(CEDIM, 2011; EERI, 2012). Van and Erciş had official populations of 526,725 and 
159,450 respectively at the time of the disaster, although the actual number of inhab-
itants may have been as many as one million people in total. The earthquake caused 
604 fatalities and 4,152 casualties (AFAD, 2012) as well as significant damage in Van 
and Erciş and many villages. An aftershock of magnitude 5.6 (Mw) on 9 November 
claimed another 40 lives and produced further damage (EERI, 2012). There was mas-
sive damage to buildings owing to poor masonry construction and the inadequate 
application of building codes (Turan, 2012). A total of 28,512 buildings suffered heavy 
damage in the initial earthquake, including 18,424 dwelling units. This figure rose 
to more than 35,000 following the aftershock (Erdik et al., 2012). In total, 60 per cent 
of housing in the Van region was damaged. 
 As in many other parts of Turkey, most of the existing buildings had not been 
properly inspected during design and construction. Although engineered buildings 
are generally designed by qualified engineers, in situ construction is typically over-
seen by an uneducated foreman and non-engineered buildings are all designed and 
constructed by uneducated workers (Tapan et al., 2013). 
 Van is one of the most backward areas of the country. More than one-half of the 
population (61 per cent) has education below high school and only 10 per cent have 
a university education (Ikizer, 2014). People’s perception of risk in Turkey is unreli-
able. A 2008 survey of more than 800 residents in two districts of southwest Istanbul, 
Avcılar and Bakırköy, which were badly affected by the magnitude Mw 6.7 Kocaeli 
earthquake in August 1999, revealed that awareness of potential danger is strongly 
correlated with educational background (Eraybar, Okazaki, and Ilki, 2010). The 
majority of respondents (greater than 60 per cent) thought that a major earthquake 
would occur in the area within 50 years and 45 per cent thought that it would occur 
within 10 years. Yet, despite the apparent danger, the majority (59 per cent) planned 
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to remain in their current house for more than 10 years. Most (80 per cent) believed 
that their house was strong enough to survive such an event and only 8 per cent had 
considered retrofitting their home. 
 Van is also one of poorest regions of Turkey and total economic damage is esti-
mated at USD 1 billion while insured losses are believed to be in the region of 
USD 20–100 million (CEDIM, 2011). Although there was much less damage than in 
Japan, the economic life of Van was destroyed by the earthquake, leaving most people 
without jobs.
 At one time nearly 300,000 people were being housed in temporary shelters in Van 
and Erciş and perhaps as many as 200,000 left the area and went to stay with rela-
tives or in accommodation organised by the government in other cities. As in Japan, 
lessons were learnt after an earlier event (the Kocaeli earthquake of 1999). Shelter 
was provided quickly, and people did not have to stay in containers as long as they did 
in Japan. The 21 square metre container houses, smaller than the Japanese versions, 
but housing much bigger families, comprised two rooms and a kitchen, bath, and 
toilet. We visited Van exactly one year after the 2011 earthquake and all of the camps 
were full (see Figure 7). They were well policed and contained shops, schools, and 
play facilities. When we returned six months later they were nearly all empty.
 Major progress had been made in rehousing people and boosting the economy by 
one year after the earthquake. Some 30,000 people had been rehoused in the city and 
some 70,000 people were moving to the new suburbs.4 People are moving to houses built 
by TOKI, the government’s housing agency, on five sites around Van (see Figure 7).
 TOKI has been active in the construction of social housing since the 1980s and 
currently functions as both a regulator and as a provider of social housing. Initially 
Figure 7. Temporary camp and new housing in Van, Turkey
Temporary camp, Van New TOKI housing, Van
Source: authors.
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the agency supplied financial support for social housing, but it has been the direct 
provider of social housing since 2003. TOKI, though, has little understanding of or 
expertise in urban planning or new settlement creation.
 The political stability of the past decade has yielded economic development and 
there has been massive state investment in the region in roads, infrastructure, and new 
settlements (Üngör and Kalafatcılar, 2014). However, the economic bounce from 
construction is only temporary and long-term recovery is less certain.5
 Although emergency response and relief by AFAD was well organised and effec-
tive, in other ways Turkey was ill-prepared for this earthquake. Disaster crisis manage-
ment is highly organised in the country, but the focus was on the disaster response 
and early recovery phases; not enough attention was paid to mitigation or long-term 
recovery (Caymaza, Akyonb, and Erenelc, 2013). As the Mayor of Erciş, Barboros 
Baran, pointed out: ‘It is difficult to recover quickly, the earthquake left us with a 
big economic problem, but slowly the city is returning to normal’.6 Schools and 
shops have reopened; there is traffic in the streets; and there is a great deal of con-
struction. More fortunate families have a member who is back at work, as a school-
teacher or taxi driver, for instance. It will be a long time before most people are fully 
recovered; for some this may never happen (Beam, 2012).
 The Government of Turkey introduced compulsory earthquake insurance in 2001 
and threatened to cut off electricity and water if people had no insurance. The law 
was enforced for only one year, though; people now buy insurance only when they 
sell the house. In Van, insurance penetration, 9 per cent in 2010, one year before 
the earthquake, is much lower than it is in Ankara (42 per cent) or Istanbul (36 per 
cent) (TCIP, 2011). People were treated to the same level of government compensa-
tion whether or not they had insurance. The decision was political, as the situation 
in Kurdish-dominated Van was fragile after the disaster: the government used the 
extraordinary situation to improve its popularity in light of the upcoming elections. 
The simple fact is that people who were not insured should not have been rehoused 
in the same way as those who were, but this would have been politically unacceptable 
to the government.
 Since the start of the twenty-first century, Turkish cities have undergone large-
scale change through a process referred to as urban transformation (Elicin, 2014), 
involving the demolition of low-income inner-city settlements. One of the justifica-
tions for the policy is to protect people from earthquakes (Saraηoğlu and Demirtaş-
Milz, 2014). The Urban Transformation Law of 2012 aims to increase the safety of 
existing housing stock by defining earthquake hazard zones and obliging people 
living in them to get professional help to analyse the earthquake risk of their build-
ing. The law, which entered into force on 16 May 2012, is new as of this writing and 
is in the process of being applied.7 
 Changes in local government have also occurred over the same period. Unlike in 
Chile and Japan, however, local democracy in Turkey does not really entail power 
distribution, political representation, and participation. Municipal Law No. 1580 of 
1930 sidestepped the democratic development of Turkish local government by making 
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it dependent on central resources and decisions. Although municipal government 
has been transformed since 2000, control of municipal functions and resources by 
central government is being switched to local mayors (Bayraktar, 2007).
 We visited a number of these new estates in the Van area. They are well built and 
most have a central play area for children. Many new cars are parked outside and 
people are generally getting on with their lives. The housing is government subsi-
dised; each house costs about USD 35,000 and is free of charge for the first two years, 
then subject to monthly interest-free payments of USD 160 over 18 years. One issue 
is that these apartments are typically 100 square metres and the average family size is 10.8
 AFAD defined the location for new housing based on geological considerations 
and land ownership and legal issues. Largely because of the intense imperative for 
speed this invariably meant government-owned land. TOKI then managed all aspects 
of the construction and built some 15,000 apartments in Van and 5,000 in Erciş in 
less than 12 months from the date of the earthquake. This rate of reconstruction is 
unprecedented. The reason it was so fast was that planning decisions were made by 
AFAD geologists on the basis of distance from a known fault and whether the land 
was government-owned. There was no public consultation of any kind. 
 AFAD engineers maintain that the impressive speed was due to taking the right 
decisions and, in the main, selecting good sites. This strategy of moving people to 
new peripheral settlements has meant that the city is expanding, particularly towards 
the south and east; planners have focused on new roads and connections to these sub-
centres. However, the new homes are isolated from the town centre and various 
experienced earthquake engineers are critical of scientific advice overriding logical 
urban planning criteria. 
 Despite talk of rebuilding a better Van, we did not see much sign of urban planning, 
either in the existing town centres or in the new TOKI housing estates. Neither AFAD 
nor TOKI engaged in any urban planning for the new settlements, and although 
they completed 20,000 new homes within one year of the disaster, these should have 
been planned better.9 When we visited the Ministry of Environment and Urban 
Planning team in Ankara responsible for Van, they were busy mapping existing use 
of land rather than planning how the city might be made ‘more liveable’. It has been 
almost impossible for the urban planners to produce radical plans to improve the city 
centres of Van or Erciş because of landownership issues. It is complex and expensive 
to ‘expropriate’ private land in Turkey and owners do not want to give up land for 
street widening, parks, or any enhancement of the public realm.10 
 One of the key post-disaster questions facing the authorities and building owners 
in Van, as elsewhere, is whether to repair or rebuild. The answer is influenced by a 
number of factors:
• the scientific and engineering assessments of ground conditions and the structural 
integrity of the building and its vulnerability to future hazards;
• the application of building codes and the rigour of the inspection process;
• whether the building is insured and for how much;
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• the relative cost of repairing and rebuilding;
• the possibility of developing the site by increasing the number of storeys or improv-
ing the planning or functionality of the building;
• the availability of funds, either in terms of capital or low interest loans; and
• multiple ownership or legal issues and the owners’ personal preferences.
 Approximately one-half of the damaged residential property in Van and Erciş 
will be repaired. A higher proportion of commercial property is likely to be repaired 
than rebuilt, because most owners will rebuild on the same site rather than moving 
and there is less financial support for commercial property. Yet, there are issues with 
the building inspection system. Notably, there are several layers of control and archi-
tects or construction managers need to get approval from several different institutions 
(Özden, 2014). New legislation passed after the earthquake suggested that this system 
would be reviewed. But from what we saw, the system does not seem to be working. 
We inspected a seven-storey building in Erciş next to the District Governor’s Palace 
where all of the columns had been sheared at the base. The owners have permission 
to shutter and repair the columns in situ. The District Governor told us that he did 
not know about the building next door, but said that building control was much 
better than it had been seven or eight years ago and that qualified engineers decided 
on repair or demolition. 
Chile
The magnitude 8.8 (Mw) Maule earthquake occurred at 03:34 on 27 February 2010 
at a depth of 35 kilometres (USGS, 2010). The event was centred 200 miles south-
west of the capital of Chile, Santiago, with a rupture zone of 500–600 kilometres. It 
was the fifth most powerful earthquake since seismic records began in 1991 and trig-
gered a tsunami that caused severe damage to many coastal settlements (Lubkowski 
et al., 2010). By most standards the Maule earthquake was a catastrophe for Chile and 
affected more than two million people. Chileans reported being surprised that they 
were not as ready for this event as they thought they were.
 Most buildings performed as they had been designed, to protect life, but eco-
nomic losses were huge, totalling approximately USD 30 billion or 17 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Franco and Siembieda, 2010). Despite the magnitude 
of the earthquake there were few major structural collapses and a relatively low death 
toll: 525, with another 25 missing. The standard of construction in Chile generally 
is good (Booth and Taylor, 1988), and the majority of fatalities, as in Japan, were due 
to the tsunami rather than to the earthquake. 
 Several factors contributed to the low casualty rate and to rapid recovery, espe-
cially the robust building code and its comprehensive enforcement. In particular, 
Chile has a law that holds building owners accountable for losses in a new building 
for 10 years. There were few fires after the earthquake, because the electricity grid was 
shut down immediately. In many areas, the emergency response was very effective 
and there was close local coordination between emergency managers and fire and 
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police personnel, without a need for communication with the capital. Finally, the high 
level of awareness meant that most people evacuated in good time and were able to 
manage living in temporary accommodation. 
 Pablo Allard was appointed National Coordinator of Urban Reconstruction at the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.11 The slogan of the Plan de Recon-
strucción (MINVU, 2010) is: ‘Our challenge: turn a catastrophe into an opportunity 
. . . for better cities, better life’. It highlights that ‘the earthquake affected severely 
the second biggest urban area in the country—Grand Concepción—and partially 
devastated five cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 45 cities with over 5,000 
inhabitants and more than 900 towns and villages on the coast or in rural areas’. In 
addition, it underlines that the state is unable to reconstruct everything or even con-
trol the process of recovery centrally from Santiago. It is the responsibility of each 
region, town council, and community to develop its own plans, with the support of 
the state. The Plan adds that, although the authorities in each locality face huge prob-
lems that they will want to address immediately, it is important that they have a long-
term strategic vision and that they proceed methodically in dealing with important 
issues concerning cultural identity, the environment, and citizen engagement if oppor-
tunities to build back better are to be realised.
 Almost immediately after the earthquake a group of 10 architects/planners was 
seconded from the two main universities in Concepción, Universidad Bio-Bio and 
Universidad Católica de Chile, to the regional government to form a master plan-
ning team to assist the affected local authorities. Of the 36 coastal settlements in the 
region, 18 suffered severe damage; the team decided to concentrate its efforts on these 
locations. They divided into three groups: Costa Norte, led by Ivan Cartes; Cos-
ta Centro, led by Waldo Martinez; and Costa Sur, led by Carolina Arriagada.12 These 
academics worked closely both with the planners in the various municipal author-
ities and with local residents and business people in the affected settlements to de-
velop a masterplan, Plan de Reconstrucción del Borde Costero, for each hamlet. 
Other outputs of this process were zone maps, depicting recommended areas for 
amenities, commerce, housing, industry, and infrastructure. Three levels of housing 
risk were defined based on the wave level (Level 1: no risk; Level 2: low risk–houses 
with a reinforced concrete ground floor; and Level 3: high risk–tsunami-resistant 
housing with an unoccupied ground floor).
 One-fifth of the population in Maule was made homeless by the earthquake and 
along the coastal margin a concrete toilet block often is all that is left of most homes. 
Displaced persons were given two options: (i) to stay on their property; or (ii) to move 
to an Aldea, or temporary housing village. In both instances, displaced persons were 
housed in Media Aguas, or temporary timber housing. Grants for tools and supplies 
were distributed to those working on repairing their homes (Hinrichs et al., 2011). 
Temporary housing was constructed from local timber and some families incorpo-
rated the shelter into their rebuilt homes. These homes are one-room, 18 square metre 
timber chalets, smaller than either the Japanese or Turkish equivalents, and the camps 
comprised 250–500 units plus sanitary blocks. However, many of the approximately 
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80,000 displaced families were still living in temporary camps like the ones we vis-
ited on the hillside above Dichato and Talcahuano 18 months after the disaster. 
 The plan is to build 70,000 dwellings and the goal was to have everyone back in 
permanent housing by the end of 2012. Allard is quoted as saying: ‘This is one of the 
most complex reconstruction efforts anyone has ever undertaken . . . Reconstruction 
means not only rebuilding what was there before, but rebuilding it better, much 
better . . . We can’t just build short-term ghettoes. We have to rebuild these cities to 
mitigate the [future] risk and exposure to earthquake and tsunami hazards’ (Padgett, 
2011). There was extensive interaction with residents and local businesses through 
focus groups and face-to-face meetings (González Muzzio, 2012). As members of 
resident and community groups had problems understanding maps, images and 
sketches were used to share ideas (see Figure 8). 
 The recovery manuals that the reconstruction team consulted (FEMA, 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c) stressed that, after the immediate relief effort, it was important to 
reinstate livelihoods as quickly as possible, both to take people’s minds off the trag-
edy and to make them independent of state support. Consequently, the main focus 
of the master planning team was to get business and commerce up and running. In 
addition, the team designed and built temporary restaurants set back from the beach 
and designated land for a park and the planting of trees. 
Source: authors.
Figure 8. Community engagement after the Maule earthquake: Residents’ Association 
meeting in Tubul 
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 The main components of the Dichato and Tubul masterplans are moving build-
ings back from the beach, planting trees, and canalising the river (see Figure 9). The 
sea defences proposed involve a much lower sea wall than in Japan, a setback of 
50–80 metres for buildings, and a 20–30 metre band of trees. Carolina Arriagada, 
the leader of the Costa Sur group, explained that, in Tubul, the coastal strip where 
people had been living was unsafe and the plan was to move the majority of homes 
to higher ground at the other end of the village, necessitating the purchase of land 
from the latifundista landowner. 
 Homes being built on the site of the existing village are tsunami-resistant. The 
government expropriated existing homes and paid people the commercial value for 
the house and improvements, independent of the subsidy for the new housing. The 
new homes are 114 square metres, slightly smaller than the existing houses. Residents 
were closely involved in planning the move and in decisions about the design of the 
Source: authors.
Figure 9. Tubul masterplan (Plan Maestro Tubul, 2010)
Speed or deliberation: a comparison of post-disaster recovery in Japan, Turkey, and Chile 
homes—interestingly, it was the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 that helped to 
convince the undecided in Chile about moving. However, the Plan Maestro Tubul 
took longer than predicted because of the lack of good information, especially mapped 
cadastral data on who lived where.
 Our impression, from talking to people in the various coastal settlements we vis-
ited, was that the need to balance speed and deliberation had been managed with 
some skill (Platt, 2012). There was intense pressure from residents to rebuild homes, 
to restore facilities, and to get the economy moving and there was a desire on the 
part of the authorities to develop new urban plans that would improve these com-
munities and make them safer. The master planning team produced the plans and 
got the funding within 12 months. Most impressively, they were able to involve resi-
dents and business people in the planning process and to keep them informed via 
regular fortnightly visits and walkabouts in the community. 
Conclusion
In Japan, the nation was traumatised by the unanticipated scale of the disaster. It is 
a matter of national pride to rebuild shattered communities and to make them safe 
‘at any cost’. This safety imperative means that ways of life and people’s relationship 
to the sea will have to change; this is a painful reality and causes dissent. By law, the 
authorities have to consult people and it is in the nature of Japanese society to try 
to reach consensus rationally. All of this takes time, undermining the possibility of 
recovery in places that were already in demographic and economic decline. 
 In Turkey, the imperative was speed, particularly to provide temporary accommo-
dation and then to rehouse people in permanent housing. The new TOKI housing 
will be much more earthquake-proof than previous homes and new hospitals, schools, 
and government buildings will be built to code. All buildings must be inspected 
before they can be repaired and, in theory, dangerous buildings that cannot be repaired 
will be demolished, although we witnessed many examples of inadequate and dan-
gerous reconstruction. Van will be much safer, but little urban design or planning 
underpins the fast-paced reconstruction.
 Chile achieved a better balance between speed and deliberation. The central gov-
ernment recognised that it would be unable to reconstruct everything or even control 
the process and national coordination was limited to defining the scale of the prob-
lem and allocating resources. Planning and implementation was the responsibility of 
regional government and specialist teams of experts. What distinguished recovery in 
Chile was community consultation and the desire to rebuild as quickly as possible 
from the bottom up but also to build back better.
Land use change and safety
There are essentially three choices regarding land use planning: (i) rebuild in the orig-
inal place; (ii) move to a safer adjacent neighbourhood; or (iii) relocate to a new place. 
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In addition, there is also the issue of whether to move whole communities collec-
tively or whether individuals should make their own arrangements (Iuchi, 2015). This 
decision depends largely on the degree of damage, the willingness of the inhabitants 
to move, the difficulty of mitigating future risk, and the economic implications of 
the move (Ye, 1996).
 In Japan, the policy was to define a hazard zone and to move people up and away. 
In the Sendai plain, this involved moving people out of detached houses and into 
apartment blocks on raised platforms some distance from the coast. On the Rias 
coast, homes were moved to higher ground on new terraces. In Turkey, between one-
third and one-half of displaced persons were rehoused in new apartment blocks sited 
on land five to six kilometres from the city. The rest of the population plus new 
migrants to the city were housed on redeveloped demolition sites or in repaired houses. 
In Chile, commercial and industrial facilities were moved back from the coast to 
behind a new promenade and a treed margin that will protect against storm surge and 
break the force of a tsunami. Housing in the hazard zone will be tsunami-proof.
Economic recovery 
Economic recovery is quite likely the most serious issue facing most communities in 
a post-disaster period, and almost certainly the central issue confronting national 
authorities in every major disaster. Bolton (1996) points out that a major disaster spawns 
an urgency to decide many things at once. 
 In Japan, much of the area affected by the disaster was in economic decline. The 
country has been in severe recession for decades and has a low birth rate and an aging 
population. The tsunami aggravated these problems. The government is trying to 
support industry and commerce through the provision of financial support and by 
improving transport links, but there is only so much it can do in the face of eco-
nomic forces. In Turkey, there has been major investment in new highways and 
infrastructure. This has produced a mini boom in construction but unemployment 
is high, and although some are getting rich through reconstruction, the majority of 
the population is struggling to make ends meet. This is a border area with Iran and 
much of the economy is based on trade, both legal and illicit. It is unclear whether 
this area will prosper or fail in the longer term. In Chile, the government assessed 
damages and losses at USD 30 billion, and estimates total public spending for recon-
struction at USD 12 billion. It will probably fund this spending through moderate tax 
increases, drawing on reserves, budget reallocations, the sale of assets, and, most sig-
nificantly, concessionary schemes with the private sector.
Planning system
A large number of authorities and organisations are involved in different aspects of 
recovery. There is a range of pre-existing and special earthquake-related plans. In 
many countries it is unclear which agency, department, or organisation is responsible 
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for planning post-disaster recovery. There is a pressing need to coordinate decision-
making, land availability, the reconstruction programme, and service provision, but 
often there is tension between local, regional, and national authorities.
 Japan faces a major bureaucratic challenge in that many different agencies need 
to coordinate decision-making. Major planning changes also require extensive public 
consultation and community agreement. This means that planning is slow and cum-
bersome, since plans are considered and evaluated carefully. In Turkey, in contrast, 
most of the important decisions are taken by officials in the capital, Ankara, without 
much reference to local stakeholders and with little or no public consultation. Hence, 
decision-making is extremely rapid, but plans are much less likely to meet local people’s 
aspirations, and opportunities to improve urban planning have been missed. In Chile, 
the really distinctive aspect of the recovery process was the quality of participation: 
the community was involved in decision-making and was kept informed of progress. 
The architects heading the three groups visited their areas regularly, at least once a 
fortnight, meeting residents and business people and just walking the streets. The 
first author accompanied two of them on various trips to the affected area and attended 
resident association meetings and ad hoc meetings with restaurant owners and shop-
keepers, witnessing the quality of this consultation in action. 
Insurance and government subsidy
Insurance can be a powerful ex-ante strategy in an earthquake risk mitigation frame-
work. Its primordial objective is to provide monetary compensation for damaged assets 
or lost income, but also it can help to achieve other important goals for society, such 
as the establishment of safer building practices, the dissemination of risk informa-
tion, and the promotion of financial responsibility (Franco, 2014). Carpenter (2014) 
estimates that 70 per cent of global economic losses due to natural catastrophes between 
1980 and 2013 were uninsured. Moreover, as risk exposure grows at a faster pace than 
insurance, the gap keeps widening.
Political issues
Davis (2006) points out that all aspects of disaster management, including longer-term 
recovery, occur within political contexts, that disasters place immense demands on 
government officials, and that the public, especially affected persons, has high expec-
tations of leaders and public officials. However, the brevity or superficiality of media 
coverage tends to underrepresent the challenges faced by governments. 
 The Government of Japan has been under intense pressure, aggravated by its 
mishandling of the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011, to 
clean up and repair the damage and to make places safe. In a polite and restrained way 
there has been intense debate on the way forward, which has caused delays but may 
prove beneficial in the long run. In Turkey, there was a political imperative, because 
of Kurdish separatist unrest, to react quickly and decisively. The government had 
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immense powers to act without recourse to the same level of public scrutiny and 
local debate as in Japan. In Chile, all those involved in reconstruction had a personal 
commitment to involve local people in decision-making and to keep them informed 
about progress.
 This paper is not comparing like with like, of course. There are major differences 
in the cultures and economies of the three countries under review and the events 
were quite different in scale.
Demographics
In Japan, the key issues are an aging population and economic decline. Tōhoku was 
already suffering shrinkage before the tsunami. It is now predicted that the popula-
tion will decrease by one-third in the next 50 years, leaving only two in five people 
economically active. In contrast, Turkey has a young population and is growing both 
demographically and economically. The population of Van is predicted to rise from 
approximately 360,000 to one million in the next 20–30 years. Chile is somewhere 
between the two (see Figure 10).
Economics
Figure 11 shows rebuild cost in comparison to GDP. The scale of recovery in Japan is 
much larger both absolutely and relative to the size of the national economy. The 
boxes also illustrate how devastating earthquakes are when accompanied by a tsunami.
The Government of Japan has allocated USD 25 trillion for the first five years of 
recovery, largely financed by the sale of reserves, although no cost–benefit analysis has 
been performed as the priority is to get the country back on its feet. This shows the 
size of the economy relative to the size of the population, and one can see immedi-
ately how wealthy Japan is per capita as compared to Chile and Turkey.
Figure 10. Population pyramids
Source: authors’ creation based on information from the US Census Bureau, International Data Base, 
2010, http://www.census.gov/data/developers/data-sets/international-database.html (last accessed on 
25 October 2016).
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Balancing speed and deliberation
One has to balance speed and deliberation during any post-disaster recovery process. 
In an ideal world recovery would be both fast and deliberate and local communities 
would be involved in strategic decision-making. In sum, recovery in Japan might be 
characterised as deliberate but slow; in Turkey it might be depicted as all speed and 
little or no deliberation; and in Chile a balance was struck between the need for speed 
and a desire to build back better. 
 Despite the demographic and economic differences described above, the questions 
to ask are: ‘Could Japan have been quicker?’; ‘Would Turkey have recovered better 
if it had been more deliberate?’; and ‘Will Chile actually be able to deliver what it 
promised?’. One can imagine that Japan might have moved more quickly if it had 
been better prepared psychologically and had managed public engagement better, and 
Turkey might have been more deliberate if urban planners had more influence. Only 
Chile, of the various places that have suffered recent disasters, has managed this bal-
ance successfully. Residents and local businesses in Chile wanted speed—they wanted 
to get back into their homes and to restore their businesses and livelihoods as quickly 
as possible. The national government, and the planning teams appointed by the Bio-
Bio regional government, wanted deliberation—they wanted to make homes, busi-
nesses, and critical services and infrastructure along the Maule coast more resilient to 
a future tsunami. Ultimately, each party got a reasonable amount of what it wanted. 
Figure 11. Scale of the disaster and the cost of recovery relative to gross national product 
(GNP) and population
Sources: authors’ creation based on information from OECD (2016) (for GNP) and from Ridgwell (2011), 
CEDIM (2011), and Fermandois (2011) (for reconstruction costs for Japan, Turkey, and Chile, respectively).
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 Comerio (2013) analysed housing recovery after the Maule earthquake of 2010. 
The disaster damaged or destroyed some 370,000 housing units (approximately 10 
per cent of the housing in six regions). Yet, within six months, the Ministry of Hous-
ing and Urban Development had published a plan to repair or rebuild, with govern-
mental assistance, 220,000 low- and middle-income housing units within four years. 
In October 2012, at the midpoint of the programme, 54 per cent were complete and 
occupied and a further 30 per cent were under construction. 
 Several factors contributed to the success of Chile: strong leadership at the national 
and local level; the utilisation of existing initiatives and institutions; the flexibil-
ity to adapt programmes over time; a strong technical staff; a robust economy; and 
political will. Comerio (2013) concluded that countries can learn from each other and 
attempt to find the ‘sweet spot’ that results in the best of government management 
(in terms of expediency and flexibility) and incorporates opportunities for citizens 
to take some control of their own recovery, with regard to housing choice and par-
ticipation in planning on the community’s future. In this, she says, Chile’s performance 
stands out.
 What lessons can one draw from this admittedly brief analysis, and specifically, 
how might it be possible to secure both speed and deliberation in disaster recovery? 
The following three points are hypothetical, but it may be possible to apply them to 
other places: 
• the national government needs to assess swiftly the loss, pass new legislation, and 
find the money; 
• a special team needs to be seconded to plan recovery and be given a clear remit to 
balance speed and deliberation; and 
• citizens should be consulted and kept informed of plans.
 A fundamental piece of advice to countries with known major hazards is to rehearse 
and to make key decisions in advance. These ‘meta decisions’ establish a framework for 
subsequent decision-making and save time by eliminating whole areas of indecision. 
They include: 
• Authority: who is in charge of disaster recovery (the existing authorities (line min-
istries and local government) or a special dedicated body)?
• Governance: to what extent is power centralised or delegated to local authorities? 
Are communities involved in setting the agenda and in decision-making? 
• Planning: should homes and activities remain in situ or should they be relocated? 
Should any built-up land be abandoned and what new land should be brought 
into use?
• Construction: should buildings be repaired or rebuilt? The decision will depend on 
building code enforcement, insurance coverage, and the relative cost.
• Resources: where is the money coming from? Should people themselves or the 
government build new homes? 
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